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posits God as a "father-substitute," and she interprets Kierkegaard's God-
relationship as "a relationship to a fatherly other" (105). Evans, on the other 
hand, writes of the relationships of the developing self to parents, lovers, 
the state, ideologies, etc., as relations to "God-substitutes" (93). Which inter-
pretation one chooses makes all the difference. 
The fifteen essays which comprise this volume challenge the reader to 
view Kierkegaard's thought through the multi-faceted prism of postmoder-
nity. Kierkegaard in Post/Modernihj does not relieve the tension of inwardness 
and political involvement, and it does not answer the critical question of 
faith. But it does succeed in revealing the persistence and importance of 
these central Kierkegaardian concerns in our day. 
Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today edited by Jeff 
Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder. Rowman and Littlefield, 1996. Pp. xiv, 
287 $58.50 (cloth). 
DAVID REITER, University of St. Thomas 
This volume, dedicated to William 1. Rowe, is a collection of eleven 
essays by a number of leading philosophers of religion. It demonstrates 
the richness and breadth of issues treated by contemporary philosophy 
of religion (notably, none of the essays are concerned with Rowe's evi-
dential argument from evil). 
Philip 1. Quinn provides an edifying discussion of Kierkegaard's 
account of the Divine command to love one's neighbor as oneself. On 
this account, any person qualifies as a neighbor, and so this command is 
radical in demanding a love which is both affectionate and universal. 
Robert Audi argues persuasively for logical compatibility, and even a 
significant positive harmony, between scientific conceptions of mind 
and theism. J.A. Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, also concerned 
with compatibility issues, argue that materialist theories of mind do not 
comport well with a "robust conception" of human freedom. 
Eleonore Stump defends (against recent work by David Widerker) the claim 
that libertarian freedom does not entail the principle of alternative possibilities. 
James Ross's piece is a unique and provocative argument for the claim that 
human freedom cannot be understood independently of theological considera-
tions such as Divine redemption. William J. Wainwright considers Jonathan 
Edwards's view that God creates the world to display His glory. Wainwright 
argues that this view is both attractive and defensible. While Edwards's posi-
tion entails that God must create, Wainwright argues that one could embrace 
Edwards's core claims without being committed to the unpalatable conse-
quence (accepted by Edwards) that God must create the actual world. 
Peter van Inwagen provides a helpful exploration of the implications of 
Clifford's principle that it is always wrong to believe p on insufficient evi-
dence. Norman Kretzmann exposits a cosmological argument from 
Aquinas which provides good evidence for the existence of an "ultimate 
universal explanatory principle." 
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Martin Curd defends an argument which purports to show that miracles 
(according to the "standard modem concept") are impossible. The argu-
ment is based on two premises: 1. Event E is a miracle only if E is an excep-
tion to a law of nature, and 2. L is a law of nature only if there are no excep-
tions to L. But Curd's discussion raises the question: how interested should 
a theist be in the question of whether or not SM-miracles (i.e., miracles 
according to the standard modem concept) are possible? Perhaps a theist 
should be quite interested in the question of whether it is possible for an 
event to occur which is specially indicative of the existence and nature of 
God, but it is not obvious that such events would need to be 5M-miracles. 
Three of the volume's eleven articles are authored by former professors 
of Rowe (Alston, Ross, and Nakhnikian). I shall restrict the remainder of 
my comments to two of these three articles. 
William P. Alston provides a careful and very interesting exploration of 
the belief! acceptance distinction and its application to religious faith. 
Leaving out many helpful details, Alston's account of the distinction can be 
summarized by saying that while accepting a proposition is a voluntary 
mental act, believing a proposition is neither voluntary nor a mental act. 
And unlike accepting p, believing p involves, among other things, a tenden-
cy to feel that p is the case, whenever one considers p. 
Moving to Alston's account of faith, "faith that" p (which should be dis-
tinguished from "faith in" a person or group of persons) differs from belief 
that p in two respects: 1. Faith that p necessarily involves a "pro-attitude" 
toward p's being true, whereas one may believe that p even if one strongly 
wishes that p were false. And 2. "'Faith that' has at least a strong suggestion 
of a weak epistemic position vis-a-vis the proposition in question. One 
would say that one has faith that Jim will be promoted only when one's evi-
dence is less than conclusive." (12) 50 if S has faith that p, this suggests that 5 
is in a weak episternic position with respect to p (whereas belief that p does 
not suggest this). Alston sees both features exhibited in Hebrews 11:1 "Faith 
is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." But I 
think it is unclear that this verse exhibits the weak episternic position feature. 
One could take "seen" here literally, so that faith would be "conviction con-
cerning invisible things." But Alston is apparently taking "seen" in the epis-
ternic sense so that faith is here defined as "conviction concerning things not 
known." But this is problematic, since it appears to render Hebrews 11:3 
self-contradictory: "By faith we understand that the universe was formed at 
God's command ... " At any rate, one of Alston's conclusions is that faith that 
p can be realized in either belief that p or acceptance that p. 
Near the end of the article, Alston asks: Are adherents of the Christian 
faith required to believe (as opposed to merely accept) the doctrines of 
Christianity? (I shall refer to this as "the belief requirement.") As evidence, 
Alston considers two biblical passages and quotations from traditional 
creeds and confessions. His comment on Hebrews 11:6 "For whoever 
would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards 
those who seek him," is the following: 
But the Greek verb translated "believe" in the Revised Standard 
Version, from which I quote, and in many other translations is pisteuo, 
BOOK REVIEWS 121 
the verbal form of the noun pistis, "faith." In English we lack a verb 
cognate of "faith," and this leads translators to settle on "believe" as 
the nearest English verb. But once we come to realize that it is not 
always belief that constitutes the cognitive aspect of faith, we can see 
that a better translation would be "have faith that he exists" (as in the 
Good News translation). Propositional "faith" can involve either belief 
or acceptance. (22) 
Alston may be correct that "have faith that he exists" is a better translation, 
but it does not follow that this verse does not support the belief require-
ment. For while we know that A-faith (i.e., faith as defined by Alston in this 
article) does not require belief, we do not know (at least not without consid-
erably more discussion) that the author of Hebrews is working with the A-
faith concept. (And I have already suggested a possible discrepancy 
between A-faith and the way "faith" is used by the author of Hebrews.) 
While Alston's brief discussion does not establish that the belief require-
ment is incorrect, it may be sufficient to show that it is not obviously correct 
(I should mention that this is all Alston claims for his discussion). And 
more importantly, I think Alston does establish his larger conclusion that an 
appreciation of the belief/acceptance distinction will enrich epistemology in 
general and the epistemology of religion in particular. 
In the final article of the book, George Nakhnikian critiques Alvin 
Plantinga's 1967 and 1983 defenses of the epistemic rationality of theistic 
belief. According to Nakhnikian, both defenses are failures, but in my opin-
ion, Nakhnikian's evaluations are not well-argued. Plantinga's 1967 
defense tries to show that belief in God is on an epistemic par with belief in 
other minds with respect to propositional or discursive evidence. Plantinga 
tentatively concludes that (in the absence of further differentiating consider-
ations) if belief in other minds is rational, then belief in God is rational too. 
Nakhnikian's main "objection" to this is simply his assertion that these 
beliefs are not on an epistemic par, because it is not obvious that belief in 
God is rational (while it is obvious that belief in other minds is rational). 
In his discussion of Plantinga's 1983 defense (where Plantinga argues 
that belief in God is analogous to perceptual belieD, Nakhnikian misrepre-
sents Plantinga as holding that all rational adults are theists: "Plantinga is 
convinced that all adult rational beings would, on reflection, acknowledge 
that they are all theists by nature ... " (236) But my main complaint against 
Nakhnikian is that he repeatedly objects to Plantinga's position on the basis 
of unsupported assumptions. I will provide just one glaring example. At 
the conclusion of the article (almost immediately after criticizing Plantinga 
for being dogmatic!), Nakhnikian states that: "It is in principle impossible to 
explain the nature of human cognition with reference to theological con-
cepts." (238) While Nakhnikian relies on this claim as a partial basis for 
rejecting Plantinga's position, he does not explain the exact meaning of this 
claim, nor does he provide any argumentation in support of it. 
I have identified some points where I differ with the authors of this inter-
esting and profitable volume. Nevertheless, I recommend it to all interested 
philosophers, and perhaps especially to those interested in epistemological 
and metaphysical issues in the philosophy of religion. 
